Changes in the measurement of fair value : implications for accounting earnings. by Fargher,  N. & Zhang,  J.
Durham Research Online
Deposited in DRO:
30 October 2015
Version of attached ﬁle:
Accepted Version
Peer-review status of attached ﬁle:
Peer-reviewed
Citation for published item:
Fargher, N. and Zhang, J. (2014) 'Changes in the measurement of fair value : implications for accounting
earnings.', Accounting forum., 38 (3). pp. 184-199.
Further information on publisher's website:
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.accfor.2014.06.002
Publisher's copyright statement:
c© 2014 This manuscript version is made available under the CC-BY-NC-ND 4.0 license
http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/
Additional information:
Use policy
The full-text may be used and/or reproduced, and given to third parties in any format or medium, without prior permission or charge, for
personal research or study, educational, or not-for-proﬁt purposes provided that:
• a full bibliographic reference is made to the original source
• a link is made to the metadata record in DRO
• the full-text is not changed in any way
The full-text must not be sold in any format or medium without the formal permission of the copyright holders.
Please consult the full DRO policy for further details.
Durham University Library, Stockton Road, Durham DH1 3LY, United Kingdom
Tel : +44 (0)191 334 3042 | Fax : +44 (0)191 334 2971
http://dro.dur.ac.uk
1 
 
 
Changes in the Measurement of Fair Value:  
Implications for Accounting Earnings 
Abstract 
With the FASB’s issue of staff position papers in 2009 and the 
relaxation of how fair value standards are applied, there has been a change in 
the practice of how fair value is measured. Since the FASB staff position 
papers in 2009, fair value measurement by financial institutions has 
increasingly relied on managerial assumptions. This study examines the impact 
of this change on the quality of earnings. Consistent with attribute substitution 
theory that emphasises reliability over relevance, we find that an apparent 
increase in managerial discretion in fair value measurement is associated with 
a higher probability of earnings management and lower earnings 
informativeness. The results indicate that allowing more managerial discretion 
in fair value measurement adversely affected the quality of financial reporting. 
Our study highlights the issue of reliable measurement in the debate among 
academics and practitioners of increasing the use of fair value accounting.  
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1. Introduction 
Drawing upon evidence from the case of Enron, Gwilliam and Jackson 
(2008) argue that the unreliability of mark to market valuations originates from 
managers' desire to manipulate earnings. More recently there has been a 
change in the practice of how fair value is measured after the Financial 
Accounting Standard Board (FASB)’s relaxation of the application of 
standards on fair value measurement (FASB 2009a, FASB 2009b). Fair value 
measurement increasingly relies on managerial assumptions, even including 
cases where a market price exists. Such a change has been subject to much 
debate among regulators, bank executives and investors (Bushman and 
Landsman 2010). Supporters of the change argue that giving managers more 
discretion in fair value measurement will convey more relevant information. 
To the contrary, critics argue that greater flexibility in fair value measurement 
will be opportunistically exploited by managers and will adversely affect the 
reliability of fair value measurement.  
While prior research documents the existence of potential manipulation 
of fair value estimates (Huizinga and Laeven 2009; Dechow et al. 2010b; 
Fiecher and Meyer 2010; Vyas 2010), there is relatively little empirical 
evidence specifically examining whether additional managerial discretion 
allowed by accounting standards on fair value measurement will, on average, 
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reveal more about a firm’s economic fundamentals or degrade the quality of 
earnings.
1
  
This study extends the emerging literature on managerial discretion in 
fair value estimates to explore the question: “What are the effects of additional 
discretion in fair value measurement allowed by changes in accounting 
standards on banks’ earnings?” Specifically, this study uses the relaxation by 
the FASB of the application of fair value standards for banks (FASB 2009a, 
2009b) to examine the relation between the change of fair value measurement 
in practice and the quality of banks’ earnings. 
In a move changing the standards on fair value measurement to 
enhance the relevance of financial reporting, the FASB issued three FASB 
Staff Position papers (FSPs) in April 2009 that effectively granted managers 
more flexibility to measure fair value assets at level 2 and 3 even where 
markets for the securities existed.
2
  Bushman and Landsman (2010, page 271) 
state that: “both the FASB and IASB bent to political pressure and generally 
allowed banks more flexibility in applying their fair value accounting.” This 
event provides an opportunity to examine the effects of increased managerial 
discretion in fair value measurement on banks’ earnings quality.  
In examining the quality of earnings, we focus on two attributes: 
reliability and relevance. These are two qualities of financial information used 
by both the Financial Accounting Standard Board (FASB) and the 
                                                 
1
 See the debate between Dechow et al. (2010b) and Barth and Taylor (2010) on whether fair value 
estimates of securitization gains are manipulated by managers.  Barth and Taylor (2010) show that 
the evidence on this issue is inconclusive and further investigation is needed. 
2
 A Wall Street Journal article estimates that the change in fair value accounting boosted banks’ 
earnings by 7% on average in Q2 2009 (Pulliam and Mcginty 2009).  
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International Accounting Standard Board (IASB) in standard setting. To 
examine the reliability and relevance of earnings, consistent with the literature 
(eg., Dechow et al. 2010a), we examine the probability of earnings 
management and the informativeness of earnings as reflected in investors’ 
response to earnings announcements. Using a sample of U.S. bank holding 
companies with fair value hierarchy disclosures, we find that an increase in 
measurement discretion in fair value increases the probability of meeting or 
beating analysts’ forecasts and the effect occurs during the period after the 
relaxation of fair value rules. We also find that an increase in discretionary fair 
value assets negatively impacts the earnings response coefficient (ERC) and 
that the effect primarily comes from the period after the relaxation of fair value 
standards.  
This study reveals that higher managerial discretion afforded from 
accounting standards is opportunistically exploited by managers in practice and 
will not enhance the relevance of financial reporting. Our results are consistent 
with the attribute substitution theory arguing relevance is a less accessible 
attribute than reliability in fair value (Kahneman and Frederick 2002; Kadous 
et al. 2012). When users of financial reports judge the source of information as 
unreliable, they will not treat the information as useful or relevant. In other 
words, fair value becomes less informative of value when it is not reliably 
measured (Hernández 2004; Penman 2007). By providing empirical evidence 
on the effects of a recent change in practice of fair value measurement, we 
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caution the promotion of relevance in the sacrifice of reliability in financial 
reporting. 
This study is organised as follows. Section 2 provides background on 
the institutional setting. Section 3 reviews prior research related to managerial 
discretion in fair value measurement and the quality of capital, and develops 
hypotheses. Section 4 and 5 describe the model and sample. Section 6 presents 
the empirical results. Section 7 discusses sensitivity analyses. Section 8 
concludes the paper. 
 
2. Background 
The use of fair value estimates can provide timely information about 
the changes in economic conditions and can serve as an early warning of 
adverse market conditions.
3
 Fair values are determined and classified using 
three different approaches. Level 1 uses unadjusted quoted market price, 
however, level 2 and 3 fair value estimates use inputs and assumptions 
determined by managers. This hierarchy can provide timely information on 
how economic conditions may impact value, but also allows significant 
management discretion in measurement and classification.
4
  
                                                 
3
 For example, the CEO of Goldman Sachs, Lloyd Blankfein, wrote in the Financial Times: “At 
Goldman Sachs, we calculate the fair value of our positions every day, because we would not 
know how to assess or manage risk if market prices were not reflected on our books. This 
approach provides an essential early warning system that is critical for risk managers and 
regulators” (‘To avoid crises, we need more transparency’, FT.com, October 2009). 
4
 A representative example of an acknowledgement by management of the flexibility in 
measurement afforded by the choice of assumptions is: “The methods to estimate fair value may 
produce a fair value calculation that may not be indicative of net realizable value or reflective of 
future fair values.” JP Morgan Chase 2010 10-K, page 157.   
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FAS 157 (FASB 2006) originally did not allow fair value to deviate 
from market price when a quoted market price exists. To avoid recognising 
large impairment losses under FAS 157, banks lobbied law makers to ease the 
fair value rules and to give managers more flexibility in valuing assets using 
internal models (Pulliam and McGinty 2009). Under political pressure from the 
Congress (Bushman and Landsman 2010), the FASB issued three Staff 
Positions (FSPs) in April 2009 that gave managers more discretion in 
determining whether to use market price or an internal model to recognise the 
fair value of assets and liabilities. For example, FASB Staff Position No. FAS 
157-4 (FASB 2009a) gives managers more power to determine when the 
market is inactive and whether a transaction is not orderly. If the market price 
is judged not to be the result of orderly sales, managers can make adjustments 
to the market price using other valuation techniques, including internally 
developed models. 
When managers believe that the market is illiquid and the market price 
does not reflect fundamental values of the assets, managers enjoy the 
flexibility not to use the quoted market price, i.e. level 1, as fair value. Instead 
managers can choose to use level 2 and 3 inputs to estimate fair value. Level 2 
inputs are derived from prices of similar assets with additional adjustments 
deemed necessary by managers
5. Level 3 inputs are derived from a firm’s 
                                                 
5
 In the case of level 2 estimates, managers were given the discretion to adjust the prices indicated 
by market indices after the relaxation of fair value rules. In the case of level 3 estimates, managers 
are given more discretion to determine the extent of market illiquidity and hence the extent as well 
as the magnitude of internal model inputs.     
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internally developed models. The more fair value assets can be classified at 
level 2 and 3, the more managerial discretion is exercisable. 
 After the relaxation of fair value rules, managers are expected to 
strategically exploit the additional flexibility in fair value measurement. Laux 
and Leuz (2010) document that bank holding companies transferred billions of 
dollars of assets measured at fair value from level 1 into level 3 during the 
financial crisis to avoid recognising impairments. For earnings management 
purposes, greater managerial discretion in determining fair value increases the 
opportunities to manage earnings, which will weaken earnings 
informativeness.  
 
3. Prior Research and Hypotheses 
Hernández (2004) argues that if fair value is not reliably measured, 
such as when the fair value is based on valuation techniques using the entity’s 
own assumptions and estimates, then fair value will be less informative of 
future cash flows. Similarly, the commentary of Penman (2007) cautions 
against the adoption of full fair value accounting when managers are naturally 
biased toward optimistic assessment of their business plans. Accounting’s role 
as counterweight is undermined by management’s optimism when hypothetical 
fair value based on managerial assumptions is admitted into the accounting 
system. Through the case of Enron, Gwilliam and Jackson (2008) show that 
fair value measurement suffers from unreliable estimates and managerial 
desires to avoid reporting mark-to-market losses. Based on the residual 
earnings valuation model, Beisland (2013) uses financial expenses to 
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demonstrate that where fair value cannot be reliably obtained, fair value will 
not be able to assist equity investors in the firm valuation process.   
Emphasising the issue of fair value measurement for banks, Heilpern et 
al. (2009) show that fair value measurement has significant implications for the 
banking industry where financial instruments and loan loss provisions are 
recorded at fair value. Fair value adjustments are volatile and can quickly 
undermine earnings and the equity cushion in bank balance sheets. Fair value 
is therefore considered as a possible driver of the credit crunch and the banking 
crisis. However, Herrmann et al. (2006) argue that fair value is superior to 
historical cost in measuring property, plant and equipment in all the qualitative 
characteristics other than verifiability. Such qualitative characteristics include 
predictive value, feedback value, timeliness, neutrality, comparability and 
consistency.  
More specifically related to managerial discretion in fair value 
measurement, previous research has found that changes in values of 
discretionary fair value assets, such as securitized loans and mortgage backed 
securities (MBS), are related to income smoothing and delay in recognising 
impairment (Huizinga and Laeven 2009; Dechow et al. 2010b; Fiecher and 
Meyer 2010; Vyas 2010). Bischof et al. (2011) examine the consequences of 
banks reclassifying fair value assets to historical cost, allowed by the 
amendment of IAS 39, and find that the reclassification is associated with 
regulatory capital arbitrage. Taken as a whole, the literature suggests that 
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managers utilise accounting discretion in fair value measurement 
opportunistically. 
Although prior research shows that fair value hierarchy disclosures are 
utilised opportunistically, the effects of greater availability of fair value 
discretion on banks’ earnings have not been specifically documented. This 
study directly examines the relation between managerial discretion in fair 
value measurement and banks’ earnings, and the changes in the relation around 
the increase in discretion allowed by the FASB in 2009. The relaxation of fair 
value rules in 2009 gave managers more discretion in choosing to use level 2 
and 3 instead of level 1 to measure the fair value of assets. As greater extent of 
managerial estimations exists in level 2 and 3 measurements, there is greater 
room to delay recognising fair value losses to manage earnings. After the 
relaxation of fair value standards, additional flexibility in fair value 
measurement allowed by accounting standards is expected to increase the 
opportunities to manage earnings. This leads to the first hypothesis:  
 
H1: Managerial discretion in fair value measurement is more positively 
associated with earnings management after the relaxation of fair value 
rules in 2009 than prior to the relaxation.    
 
Managerial discretion is of course difficult to measure. Following 
previous research we use the amount of fair value assets disclosed at level 2 
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and 3 in the fair value hierarchy (i.e. the discretionary fair value assets)
6
 to 
indicate the level of potential managerial discretion in fair value measurement. 
Managers are expected to disclose relatively more assets at level 2 and 3 to 
avoid directly recognising losses in earnings when market conditions are 
expected to deteriorate.
7
 
If greater managerial discretion in estimating fair value leads to a 
greater extent of earnings management, then earnings would become less 
reliable. Traditional view on fair value does not differentiate between 
reliability and relevance attributes of fair value measurement and pays little 
attention to the relation between these two attributes (Barth et al. 2001; Kadous 
et al. 2012). As a development of the traditional view, attribute substitution 
theory considers that individuals substitute an evaluation of a less accessible 
attribute with a more accessible one. The accessibility of an attribute relates to 
the difficulty to conceptualise and the frequency to use the attribute 
(Kahneman and Frederick 2002). Reliability is a basic property of fair value 
measurement that users understand well. On the other hand, relevance is 
decision specific and requires difficult analysis (Kadous et al. 2012). Therefore 
when investors are aware that fair value measurement is less reliable after the 
                                                 
6
 It is assumed that there is greater management flexibility when valuing level 2 and 3 securities 
relative to level 1 where an observable market price is typically available. While this assumption 
has been used in prior research it must be acknowledged that the types of securities held also vary 
between levels 1, 2 and 3 and, as with previous research, the results must be interpreted with 
respect to this potential confounding of type of securities held and the method for estimating the 
discretionary component of the fair value of the securities held. 
7
 For example, level 3 fair value assets of some bank holding companies, such as Merrill Lynch, 
increased by as much as 70 percent compared with the pre-crisis balance. In this way, banks were 
able to limit the negative effect of declines in fair value on net income or owners’ equity (Laux 
and Leuz 2009). Marking-to-model at level 3 allows declines in current value to be considered to 
be temporary and helps avoid recognising losses. 
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change of practice, they will treat earnings, which are affected by changes in 
fair value, as less useful or relevant. This argument echoes Hernández (2004) 
and Penman (2007), suggesting that earnings become less credible to investors 
and less informative of cash flows in the presence of greater managerial 
discretion in fair value measurement. Consequently more managerial discretion 
in fair value measurement after the relaxation of fair value standards is 
expected to lead to a lower earnings response coefficient. This leads to the 
second hypothesis:  
 
H2: Managerial discretion in fair value measurement more negatively 
impacts the earnings response coefficient after the relaxation of fair 
value rules in 2009 than prior to the relaxation.    
 
4. Research Design 
4.1. Test for Earnings Management 
To provide evidence on H1, we test whether greater managerial 
discretion in fair value measurement is associated with a higher probability of 
earnings management. We use an increase in discretionary fair value assets 
(level 2 and 3 fair value assets) to proxy for greater managerial discretion in 
fair value measurement. Intuitively the more fair value assets can be classified 
at level 2 and 3, the more managerial discretion is exercisable. Dechow et al. 
(2010a) show that meeting or beating analysts’ forecasts by a small amount 
provides the most consistent evidence on earnings management. Therefore we 
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examine the relation between increases in discretionary fair value assets and 
the probability of meeting or beating analysts’ forecasts, adopting an approach 
similar to Phillips et al. (2003) and Ayers et al. (2006). 
In order to make use of the panel structure of the dataset, we estimate a 
fixed effect Logit model. We also include indicator variables for years in the 
fixed effect Logit model to account for the yearly changes experienced by all 
banks. The model is specified as below:  
                             
0 1 2 3
4 5 6 1 7 1 8
9 10 11 12 13
*
1
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q q q
q q q q q
q q q q q
q
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    
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Where: 
EM = 1 if bank i's quarter q analysts' earnings forecast error is 
from zero to 1 cent per share, and 0 otherwise. Analyst 
forecast error is defined as actual earnings per share as 
reported by I/B/E/S less the median of the last analyst 
forecasts after the previous quarter's earnings announcement 
and before the current quarter's earnings announcement; 
POST = indicator variable equal to 1 if the bank-quarter observation 
occurs during the post relaxation period of fair value rule, 
and 0 otherwise; 
∆DFV = indicator variable equal to 1 if the discretionary fair value 
assets increased from quarter q-1 to quarter q, and 0 
otherwise; discretionary fair value assets are defined as the 
sum of fair value assets measured at level 2 and 3; 
ULLP = unexpected loan loss provisions, estimated following the 
procedures in Wahlen (1994); 
ΔCFO = change in bank i's cash flows from continuing operations 
from q-1 to q, scaled by total assets at the beginning of 
quarter q ;  
SIZE = size of the bank, estimated as the natural log of total assets; 
BM = market to book ratio, estimated as the book value of equity 
over the market value of equity; 
DISPERS = analyst forecast dispersion, measured as the standard 
deviation of analyst earnings forecast; 
NUMEST = analyst coverage, measured as the number of analysts 
covering the bank; 
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CHGINC = change in earnings, estimated as the change in bank i's 
earnings per share from quarter q-1 to quarter q deflated by 
the bank's share price at the beginning of quarter q; 
PERSIST = earnings persistence, measured as an indicator variable 
equal to 1 if the bank is within middle three quintiles of the 
distribution of CHGINC and 0 otherwise; 
CR1 = tier 1 capital ratio; 
CR  = total capital ratio; 
q = time subscript for quarter q. 
 
EM is an indicator of earnings management, as meeting or beating 
analysts’ forecasts generates positive equity returns and there are an 
unproportionally large number of companies meeting or beating analyst 
forecast by just 1 cent (Burgstahler and Dichev 1997; Degeorge et al. 1999). 
 Discretionary fair value assets are defined as the sum of level 2 and 3 
fair value assets, as level 2 and 3 fair value assets are measured with 
managerial discretions (FASB 2006, 2009a). An increase in the amount of 
discretionary fair value assets (ΔDFV) indicates more discretion that can be 
exerted by managers in fair value measurement. With more fair value 
discretion, managers could avoid recognising losses into earnings to meet or 
beat analysts’ forecasts. Therefore the coefficient on ΔDFV is predicted to be 
positive, indicating that the probability of earnings management to meet or 
beat analyst forecast rises with an increase of managerial discretion in fair 
value measurement. Interacting POST with ΔDFV shows the effect of the 
relaxation of accounting rules on the association between managerial discretion 
and earnings management. The coefficient on POST*ΔDFV is expected to be 
positive, indicating higher probability of meeting or beating analyst forecast 
after the relaxation of fair value rules. 
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 We include a series of control variables which have been suggested to 
be related with meeting or beating analysts’ forecasts. Wahlen (1994) argues 
that abnormal loan loss provisions (ULLP) is an appropriate measure of a 
bank’s abnormal accruals because loan loss provisions represent the largest 
accrual for banks. Higher ULLP indicates better performance (Wahlen 1994; 
Liu et al. 1997) and should reduce the need to manage earnings. ΔCFO is the 
change in operating cash flows. Increases in cash flows reflect better current 
performance and lead to less need to manage earnings (Phillips et al. 2003). 
We include bank size (SIZE), analyst coverage (NUMEST) and analyst forecast 
dispersion (DISPERS) to control for cross-sectional differences in the 
information environment that may explain variations in forecast accuracy 
(Payne 2008; Davis et al. 2009). We include the book to market ratio (BM), 
which controls for the future growth. High-growth firms more likely to manage 
earnings to meet target as their share price is more sensitive to missing analyst 
forecasts (McVay et al. 2006). Change in earnings (CHGINC) and earnings 
persistence (PERSIST) are included because greater changes and less 
persistence of earnings are more difficult to forecast (Payne 2008). We also 
include tier 1 and total capital ratios. Kanagaretnam et al. (2010) show that 
both tier 1 and total capital adequacy ratios are related with banks’ earnings 
management as higher capital adequacy suggests better performance and 
easiness to meet or beat analysts’ forecasts. Finally, we choose between a fixed 
effect model and a random effect model for this dataset, using the Hausman 
test to test the null hypothesis that the coefficients estimated by the random 
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effect estimator are the same as the ones estimated by the fixed effect estimator 
(Hausman 1978). 
 
              4.2. Test for Earnings Informativeness 
To provide evidence on H2, we test whether greater managerial 
discretion in fair value measurement impacts on earnings informativeness. 
Similar to the test of H1, we use an increase of discretionary fair value assets 
(level 2 and 3 fair value assets) to proxy for greater managerial discretion in 
fair value measurement. Following prior research (eg., Altamuro et al. 2005; 
Dechow et al. 2010a), we use the earnings response coefficient (ERC) as an 
indicator of earnings informativeness. The assumption is that if managerial 
discretion in fair value distorts the informativeness of earnings then the equity 
return for a given level of unexpected earnings should be lower. To test for the 
potential impact of greater managerial discretion in fair value measurement on 
earnings informativeness, we adopt an approach similar to Altamuro et al. 
(2005) and estimate a short-window ERC model to test the impact of an 
increase of discretionary fair value assets on ERC.  
In order to make use of the panel structure of the dataset, we estimate a 
model with firm fixed effects. We include year indicator variables in the fixed 
effect Logit model to account for the yearly changes experienced by all banks. 
We choose between a fixed effect model and a random effect specification for 
this dataset based upon the Hausman test (Hausman 1978). The model is 
specified below: 
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Where: 
CAR  = cumulative market-adjusted returns (raw return minus the 
value-weighted market index), inclusive of dividends and 
other distributions computed over the three-day window 
surrounding the earnings announcement beginning one day 
before and one day after the quarter earnings announcement; 
POST = indicator variable equal to 1 if the bank-quarter observation 
occurs during the post relaxation period of fair value rule, 
and 0 otherwise; 
ΔE = unexpected earnings, measured as the seasonally adjusted 
change in net income for bank i, scaled by end-of-period 
shares outstanding; 
∆DFV = indicator variable equal to 1 if the discretionary fair value 
assets increased from quarter q-1 to quarter q, and 0 
otherwise; discretionary fair value assets are defined as the 
sum of fair value assets measured at level 2 and 3; 
q = time subscript for quarter q. 
 
CAR is the three day cumulative market-adjusted stock returns around 
the earnings announcement. Similar to Altamuro et al. (2005), ΔE is the 
unexpected earnings, measured as the seasonally adjusted changes in quarterly 
earnings. ΔDFV is an indicator variable equals to 1 if the amount of 
discretionary fair value assets increases from last quarter and 0 otherwise. The 
coefficients on ΔDFV, ΔE*ΔDFV and ΔE*ΔDFV*POST are expected to be 
negative, indicating greater managerial discretion in fair value measurement 
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negatively impacts earnings informativeness and the relaxation of fair value 
rule intensifies such negative impacts. We include year fixed effects to account 
for the yearly changes experienced by all banks.  
 
5. Sample 
5.1. Sample Selection 
While fair value hierarchy disclosures are mandatory for all firms, we 
focus on the banking industry for several reasons. First, the estimation of fair 
value is a crucial issue for the adequacy of banks’ regulatory capital because 
impairment losses can have substantial impacts on the calculations of the 
capital ratios (Pulliam and McGinty 2009). Second, the relaxation of fair value 
rules is considered to be a direct result of bank lobbying and is considered to 
have direct impacts on boosting banks’ earnings and capital adequacy 
(Bushman and Landsman 2010). Third, as banks operate in a highly regulated 
industry, their fair value assets and measurements are more homogenous than 
firms in other industries. Fair value hierarchy disclosure requirements under 
FAS 157 were adopted by most banks from the first quarter of 2007. Therefore 
the sample period starts from the first quarter of 2007 until the third quarter of 
2011 (inclusive). 
The initial sample for the earnings management test (hereafter EM test) 
includes all the U.S. bank holding companies in Bank Compustat with non-
missing values for fair value hierarchy disclosures (level 1, 2 and 3). There are 
7,306 bank quarter observations available from Bank Compustat. The banks’ 
fair value hierarchy disclosure data is then merged with I/B/E/S using official 
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tickers, requiring non-missing values of analysts’ median earnings forecasts 
before the earnings announcement date. Non-missing values of non-performing 
loan, loan loss provisions and loan loss allowances are further required to 
estimate the abnormal loan loss provisions. The final sample for the EM test 
has 3,431 bank quarter observations for 394 banks over 19 quarters.  
The sample for the earnings response coefficient test (hereafter ERC 
test) also starts from all available observations of fair value hierarchy 
disclosures in Bank Compustat. The data is then merged with CRSP using 
“permno” codes. The test requires non-missing values of daily stock returns 
one day before, one day after and on the earnings announcement date. If the 
date occurs on a public holiday, then the next closest available observation of 
daily stock return is used. Merging Bank Compusat and CRSP yields 4,148 
earnings announcement observations for the sample used for the ERC test. 
 
5.2. Sample Characteristics 
Table 1 summarises the characteristics of interest before and after the 
relaxation of fair value standards.
8
 The mean and median values of level 2 and 
3 assets (Level23) significantly increased after the relaxation of fair value 
rules, while the mean and median values of level 1 assets (Level1) decreased. 
Without the relaxation of fair value standards, banks are expected to record 
large impairment losses related to fair value assets. Table 1 however shows 
                                                 
8
 The tests in Table 1 include all bank quarter observations with non-missing data for disclosures 
of  fair value assets (Level23), level 1 fair value assets (Level1), net income before extraordinary 
items (Inc), natural log of total assets (Size), market value of equity (Mve), total liabilities to total 
assets (Lev), and tangible common equity (Tce) from Bank Compustat. The variables Level23, 
Level1, Inc and Tce are deflated by beginning-of-period total assets. 
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that mean profitability (net income) did not significantly change over time. 
This might indicate that banks managers use additional discretions in fair value 
measurement to avoid recognising fair value losses. As a whole, Table 1 
emphasises an increased use of level 2 and 3 estimates in fair value 
measurement after the relaxation of fair value standards and the need to 
investigate the effects of such an increase.  
Panel A of Table 2 reports the descriptive statistics for the variables 
used in the test of earnings management. Approximately 10 per cent of the 
sample just meet or beat analysts’ forecasts.9 The mean value of changes in 
discretionary fair value assets (∆DRA) is 0.53, indicating that more than half of 
the sample experienced an increase in discretionary fair value assets.  
Panel B of Table 2 reports the Pearson (Spearman) correlations above 
(below) the diagonal for the variables in Equation (1). The correlation is 
positive but insignificant between an increase in discretionary fair value assets 
(∆DFV) and meeting the earnings benchmark (EM).10 As expected, abnormal 
loan loss provisions (ULLP) are negatively correlated with EM.
11
 Earnings 
persistence (PERSIST) is positively correlated with EM, indicating persistent 
earnings are easier to forecast. Capital ratios are positively correlated with EM, 
suggesting banks with higher capital adequacy are better performers and more 
                                                 
9
 Most banks experienced negative earnings growth in the sample period due to the impact of the 
financial crisis. Matsunaga and Park (2001) report 8.3 per cent of companies meeting or beating 
forecasts for firms with negative growth in earnings.  
10
 We also tested the correlation between the levels of these two variables. Specifically, we 
tested the correlation between the amount in cents of beating or missing analyst forecasts (AEM) 
and the amount of discretionary fair value assets of a bank (DFV). The correlation is at 0.014 and 
insignificant.  
11
 The higher value of Spearman correlation between ULLP and POST than the Pearson 
correlation indicates the correlations between ULLP and POST can be better described by a 
monotonic function using rank scales than parametric values.  
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often meet earnings targets.
12
 As a whole, the relation between discretion in 
fair value measurement and the probability of meeting earnings targets is 
unclear from the univariate analyses. It is therefore necessary to further 
investigate this relation using multivariate analysis.  
Panel A of Table 3 reports the descriptive statistics for the variables 
used in the ERC test. CAR has close means and medians, which is reasonable 
for short-window (3 days) cumulative stock returns. The mean and median of 
unexpected earnings (ΔE) are both negative, showing that most sample banks 
experience negative earnings growth in the sample period. The mean value of 
∆DFV is 0.48, indicating about half of the sample experience an increase in 
discretionary fair value assets.  
Panel B of Table 3 reports the Pearson (Spearman) correlations above 
(below) the diagonal for the variables in Equation (2). As expected, ΔE is 
positively correlated with CAR. POST is positively correlated with both ΔE, 
showing an increase in unexpected earnings after the relaxation of fair value 
rules. The correlations between the variables are all below 0.3, indicating that 
multicollinearity is not a concern. As a whole, the relation between discretion 
in fair value measurement and the earnings response coefficient is unclear from 
the univariate analyses. It is necessary to further investigate this relation in the 
multivariate analyses.  
 
6. Results 
                                                 
12
 The VIF values for all the variables used in Equation (1) are below 3.5, indicating that multi-
collinearity is not a concern in this model.  
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6.1 Results of the Earnings Management Test 
Table 4 reports the results of the earnings management test by 
estimating the Logit model of meeting or beating analyst forecast specified in 
Equation (1). Because the Hausman test shows there is no significant 
difference between the random and fixed effect Logit models (Chi-Square = 
8.12, P = 0.91), we report the results for both random and fixed effect Logit 
models based on Equation (1).
13
 Both random and fixed effect models include 
indicator variables for year to take into account time fixed effects, specifically 
the yearly changes experienced by all banks. Both models have good 
explanatory power with the likelihood ratios significant at p < 0.01. The 
pseudo R
2
 stands at 10 per cent for the Logit model without the interaction of 
∆DFV*POST, and 11 per cent for the Logit model with the interaction of 
∆DFV*POST. The average marginal effects of the coefficients are reported in 
the column beside the coefficients. As the results of the random and fixed 
effect models in Panel A and B are similar, only the results in Panel A are 
discussed.  
The coefficient on ∆DFV is insignificant in Column 1 (without 
interaction with POST), indicating an increase in discretionary fair value assets 
is, on average, not significantly associated with the probability of meeting 
analyst forecast. Turning to Column 2 (interacting POST with ∆DFV), the 
coefficient on ∆DFV remains insignificant, suggesting an increase in 
discretionary fair value assets is insignificantly associated with the probability 
                                                 
13
 Note that the fixed effect Logit model includes fewer observations. The firms which do not 
demonstrate enough time variation in the dependent variable are dropped in the statiscal 
calculations when estimating the coefficients for the fixed effect Logit models.  
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of meeting analyst forecast before the relaxation of fair value standards. 
Consistent with H1, the coefficient on the interaction term ∆DFV*POST is 
positive and significant. The average marginal effect of the interaction term is 
3.5 per cent. Moreover the sum of the coefficients on ∆DFV and ∆DFV*POST 
is significantly positive (Z = 2.12, P = 0.03). The result indicates that the 
positive association between fair value discretion and meeting earnings target 
is primarily in the period after the relaxation of fair value standards. 
As expected, the coefficient on the value of the loan loss provision 
(ULLP) is significantly negative, as higher loan loss provisions increase 
expenses and decrease earnings. The coefficient on the earnings persistence 
(PERSIST) is significantly positive, as persistent earnings are easy to forecast 
accurately and increase the probability of meeting analysts’ forecasts. The 
coefficient on total capital ratio (CR) is significantly positive, as higher capital 
ratios indicate better bank performance and increase the chance of meeting 
analysts’ forecasts.  
 
6.2 Results of the Earnings Informativeness Test 
Table 5 reports the results of the earnings informativeness test by 
estimating the fixed effects ERC model specified in Equation (2), i.e., the 
regression of earnings announcement period returns on unexpected earnings. 
The Hausman test confirms that the fixed effect model is the preferred 
approach for the ERC model (Chi-Square = 87.74, P < 0.01) over the random 
effects model. The fixed effects model includes year indicator variables to 
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account for the yearly changes experienced by all banks. Consistent with 
Altamuro et al. (2005), the R
2 
of the model is at 1 per cent. The low 
explanatory power is consistent with explaining the earnings announcement 
return in an industry where there is significant analyst following, publically 
available interest rate data and other information available prior to the release 
of earnings.  
As expected, the coefficient on unexpected earnings (ΔE) is 
significantly positive, indicating higher unexpected earnings are associated 
higher earnings announcement period returns. The significant coefficient on 
POST suggests the separation of the time period based on the change of fair 
value rules has incremental explanatory power over the year dummies for the 
earnings announcement period returns. The coefficient on ΔE*∆DFV, which is 
the effect of fair value assets prior to the relaxation of the rules, is 
insignificant. The result suggests that discretion in fair value measurement has 
limited impact on the ERC before the relaxation. Consistent with H2, the 
coefficient on ΔE*∆DFV*POST is significantly negative, indicating that the 
impact of managerial discretion in fair value measurement on the earnings 
response coefficient significantly and negatively increased after the relaxation 
of fair value standards in 2009 than prior to the relaxation.
14
  
 
6.3 Summary of Results 
                                                 
14
 We also ran the ERC regression separately for each year from 2007 to 2010. The coefficient on 
the change in discretionary fair value assets (DFV) is negative and significant in 2008 and 2010. 
The coefficient on the interaction of DFV and Earnings is negative and significant in 2009 and 
2010. 
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The results are consistent with both H1 and H2. H1 predicts that 
managerial discretion in fair value measurement is more positively associated 
with earnings management after the relaxation of fair value standards in 2009 
than prior to the relaxation. Using a fixed effect Logit model, the results 
indicate that an increase in discretionary fair value assets is associated with a 
higher probability of meeting earnings target after the relaxation of fair value 
standards. The result is similar when using a random effect Logit model. The 
result indicates that greater managerial discretion in fair value measurement 
leads to more earnings management.  
H2 predicts that managerial discretion in fair value measurement more 
negatively impacts the earnings response coefficient after the relaxation of fair 
value rules than prior to the relaxation. Using a fixed effect model, the results 
indicate that an increase in discretionary fair value assets more negatively 
impacts on the earnings response coefficient after the relaxation of fair value 
rules than prior to the relaxation. This result indicates that greater managerial 
discretion in fair value measurement leads to lower earnings informativeness.   
Overall, the results suggest that greater managerial discretion in fair 
value measurement increases the probability of earnings management and 
negatively affects the reliability of earnings. Consistent with the attribute 
substitution theory, less reliable fair value measurement also deceases the 
ERC, negatively affecting the relevance and usefulness of earnings to the users 
of financial statements,.   
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7. Supplementary Analyses 
Because of the small amount of liabilities disclosed at fair value the 
analysis focuses on the fair value of assets. We also estimated the models using 
both fair value of assets and liabilities. The results remain similar to those 
reported and are not sensitive to the inclusion of the fair value of liabilities. 
Because of the small amount of liabilities disclosed at fair value, no significant 
relation is found between earnings and the fair value of liabilities alone. The 
results including fair value liabilities are reported in Table 6. As both random 
and fixed effect models produce similar results, only the results of the fixed 
effect Logit model are presented.   
Instead of an indicator variable, we also use a continuous variable for 
the change in discretionary fair value assets. The change in fair value assets 
potentially has a relation to change in earnings if the changes in fair value of 
assets are included directly in earnings. If the changes of fair value assets are 
included in other comprehensive income, there should not be any direct 
connection with earnings. Fair value changes can be included in other 
comprehensive income if such changes are considered as temporary. Whether a 
change is temporary or not is discretionarily determined by managers (FASB 
2009b). It is unlikely that there is a one to one relation between changes in fair 
value assets and earnings, therefore it is conceptually correct to use an 
indicator variable. Nonetheless, we conduct test using the actual amount of 
changes in fair value assets. As expected, the results are qualitatively similar 
but weaker due to the increased noise introduced by large changes in fair 
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value. The term of ∆DFV*POST remains significant only in the ordinary Logit 
model without year fixed effects. The results are reported in Table 7. 
We also add a variable representing the amount of assets recorded at 
level 2 and 3 in the fair value hierarchy (DFV). Then we add the term 
DFV*POST. Adding this additional term could be important because it 
conveys information on whether POST captures the effect of the relaxation of 
fair value standards or only the time effects. To provide richer information, we 
also interact POST with all the variables except the change of cash flows 
(ΔCFO), which should not be affected by a change in accounting 
measurement. The results of the additional specifications are reported in Table 
8.  
Table 8 shows that the term of DFV*POST is insignificant in contrast 
to the term of ∆DFV*POST, which continues to be significantly positive. This 
contrast indicates that POST captures the effect of the relaxation of fair value 
standards rather than only the time effects. Only the term directly related to the 
relaxation of fair value standards (i.e., ∆DFV) is significant after interacting 
with POST. The levels of discretionary fair value assets (DFV) and the other 
controls are not directly related to the relaxation of fair value standards. 
Therefore their interactions with POST remain insignificant. However the 
multiple interactions with POST make the results of the additional test weaker 
than the main test, as the term of ∆DFV*POST remains significant only in the 
ordinary Logit model with year dummies.    
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In the ERC test, this paper follows Altamuro et al. (2005) and uses 
seasonally adjusted changes in quarterly earnings. To investigate the 
robustness of the ERC test, the test is replicated using analyst forecast errors 
deflated by share price at beginning of the quarter or ten days before the 
earnings announcement date, the results remain qualitatively similar. We also 
deleted 3-day cumulative returns greater than 30 per cent. The results remain 
qualitatively similar to those reported. We also use two and five day 
cumulative market adjusted return around the earnings announcement, the 
results are qualitatively similar to those reported in the main tests. The market 
reaction to earnings may experience a structural change post 2009 due to the 
change in macroeconomy. To control the potential effects of macroeconomic 
factors and firm characteristics related to macroeconomy, we added size 
(measured as the natural log of total assets), growth (measured as the market to 
book ratio) and risk free interest rates (1-year U.S. T-bill rates) to the ERC test, 
the results are reported in the additional column marked ‘With additional 
controls’ in Table 5 and remain qualitatively similar. 
 
8. Conclusion 
In this study we compare the relations between changes in discretionary 
fair value assets and earnings prior to and after the relaxation of the application 
of fair value standards by the FASB. Consistent with the argument of the 
critics of the relaxation of fair value rules (Bushman and Landsman 2010), we 
find evidence that increases in discretionary fair value assets are associated 
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with increased earnings management. Similarly we find that increases in 
discretionary fair value assets are associated with a lower informativeness of 
earnings as reflected in a lower earnings response coefficient. We also find that 
the negative effects of an increase in fair value discretion on earnings mainly 
come from the period after the relaxation of fair value rules. Our evidence is 
consistent with the contention of critics that the relaxation of fair value rules 
facilitates greater managerial discretion that is exploited by managers and 
adversely affects the quality of financial reporting. 
The results of this study provide information of interest to policy 
makers and regulators by showing the adverse effects of a change in practice of 
fair value measurement on accounting earnings. This study demonstrates the 
need to take into consideration the degree of subjectivity of fair value estimates 
in discussions of the merits and drawbacks of increased use of fair value in the 
accounting system. As illustrated in Table 1, most assets reported at fair value 
by financial institutions rely on level 2 and 3 inputs to estimate their value. Our 
results are generally consistent with the management of financial institutions 
having incentives to limit the impact of fair value adjustments on reported 
earnings and capital reserves during the period examined. Such an impact 
might lead to a deterioration of share prices and undermine stakeholders’ 
confidence in refinancing a bank’s regulatory capital under adverse market 
conditions. Management discretion can serve to dampen the perceived negative 
impacts of fair value adjustments but at the expense of both reliability and 
relevance. With the IASB and the FASB promoting increased use of fair value 
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in practice (Beisland 2013), the results of this study have implications for the 
controversies and debates surrounding the perceived trade-off between the 
reliability and relevance of fair value accounting.    
The limitations of this type of research design include the inability to 
directly observe the discretionary component of the fair value estimates. The 
results must be interpreted with respect to this limitation. Also of concern is 
that the relaxation of fair value rules is more likely to lead to movements from 
level 1 to levels 2 and 3, rather than the reverse. The statistical tests are 
therefore effectively comparing the predicted changes against a null of no 
effect, as it is highly unlikely that managers would reclassify securities upward 
from levels 2 and 3 to level 1 following the granting of increased discretion.  
A limitation of this study also lies in the difficulty of substantiating 
arguments about the relationship between value and information. As pointed 
out in Dechow et al. (2010a), the ERC captures the overall quality of earnings 
but does not distinguish between the contributions of fundamental 
performance, and the accounting system that measures fundamental 
performance, to overall decision usefulness. Moreover, while the exact nature 
of the relation between investor responsiveness to earnings is disclosure 
specific, non-earnings information (such as information environment) can have 
potential influence on how investors respond to information content in 
earnings.  
Future research is needed to examine the impact of the relaxation of 
fair value rules on analysts’ forecasts, valuation and capital disclosures over 
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longer time periods where data permits, and research using qualitative and 
other methods is needed to better understand the relations between incentives, 
ethics and the extent of opportunistic management behaviour with respect to 
the preparation of fair value estimates. 
  
31 
 
REFERENCES 
Altamuro, J., Beatty, A. L., & Weber, J. (2005). The effects of accelerated 
revenue recognition on earnings management and earnings 
informativeness: Evidence from SEC Staff Accounting Bulletin No. 101. 
Accounting Review, 80, 373–401. 
Ayers, B. C., Jiang, J. X., & Yeung, P. E. (2006). Discretionary accruals and 
earnings management: An analysis of pseudo earnings target. Accounting 
Review, 81, 617–652. 
Barth, M.E., Beaver, W. H., Hand, J. R. M., & Landsman, W. R. (2001). The 
relevance of value relevance literature for financial accounting standard 
setting: another view. Journal of Accounting & Economics 31, 77–104. 
Barth, M. E., & Taylor, D. J. (2010). In defence of fair value: Weighing the 
evidence on earnings management and asset securitizations. Journal of 
Accounting & Economics, 49, 26–33. 
Beisland, L.A. (2013). Equity valuation in practice: the influence of net financial 
expenses. Accounting Forum, forthcoming.  
Burgstahler, D., & Dichev, I. (1997). Earnings management to avoid earnings 
decreases and losses. Journal of Accounting & Economics, 24, 99–126. 
Bischof, J., Brüggemann, U., & Daske, H. (2011). Fair value reclassifications of 
financial assets during the financial crisis. Working paper, University of 
Mannheim and Humboldt University of Berlin.  
32 
 
Bushman, R. M. & Landsman, W. R. (2010). The pros and cons of regulating 
corporate reporting: A critical review of the arguments. Accounting & 
Business Research, 40, 259–273. 
Davis, L.R., Soo, B.S., & Trompeter, G.M. (2009). Auditor tenure and the ability 
to meet or beat earnings forecasts. Contemporary Accounting Research, 
26, 517–548. 
Dechow, P. M., Ge, W., & Schrand, C. (2010a). Understanding earnings quality: 
A review of the proxies, their determinants and their consequences. 
Journal of Accounting & Economics, 50, 344–401. 
Dechow, P. M., Myers, L. A., & Shakespeare, C. (2010b). Fair value accounting 
and gains from asset securitizations: A convenient earnings management 
tool with compensation side-benefits. Journal of Accounting & 
Economics, 49, 2–25. 
Degeorge, F., Patel, J., & Zeckhauser, R. (1999). Earnings management to exceed 
thresholds. Journal of Business, 72, 1–33. 
Fiecher, P., & Meyer, C. (2010). Discretion in fair value measurement of banks 
during the 2008 financial crisis. Working paper, University of Zurich.  
Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB). (2006). Fair Value 
Measurements. Statement of Financial Accounting Standards No. 166. 
Norwalk,CT: FASB.  
Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB).  (2009a). FASB Staff Position 
No. FAS 157-4, Determing Fair Value When the Volume and Activity for 
33 
 
the Asset or Liability Have Significantly Decreased and Identifying 
Transactions That Are Not Orderly. Norwalk,CT: FASB.  
Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB).  (2009b). FASB Staff Position 
No. FAS 115-2 and FAS 124-2, Recognititon and Presentation of Other-
Than-Temporary Impairments. Norwalk,CT: FASB.  
Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB).  (2009c). FASB Staff Position 
No. FAS 107-1 and APB 28-1, Interim Disclosures about Fair Value of 
Financial Instruments. Norwalk,CT: FASB.  
Gwilliam, D., & Jackson, R. (2008). Fair value in financial reporting: Problems 
and pitfalls in practice a case study analysis of the use of fair valuation at 
Enron. Accounting Forum, 32, 240-259.  
Hausman, J. (1978). Specification tests in econometrics. Econometrica, 46, 1251–
1271.  
Heilpern, E., Haslam, C., & Anderson, T. (2009). When it comes to the crunch: 
What are the drivers of the US banking crisis? Accounting Forum 33, 99–
113.  
Hernández Hernández, F.G. (2004). Another step towards full fair value 
accounting for financial instruments. Accounting Forum, 28, 167–179.  
Herrmann, D., Saudagaran, S.M., & Thomas, W.B. (2006). The quality of fair 
value measurement for property, plant and equipment. Accounting Forum 
30, 43–59.  
34 
 
Huizinga, H., & Laeven, L. (2009). Accounting discretion of banks during a 
financial crisis. Working paper, Tilburg University and International 
Monetary Fund (IMF). 
Kadous, K., Koonce, L., and Thayer, J.M. (2012). Do financial statement users 
judge relevance based on properties of reliability? Accounting Review 87, 
1335−1356.  
Kahneman, D., and Frederick. S. (2002). Representativeness revisited: Attribute 
substitution in intuitive judgment. In T. Gilovich, D. Griffin, and D. 
Kahneman, In, Heuristics and Biases: The Psychology of Intuitive 
Judgment, pp. 49–81. New York: Cambridge University Press. 
Kanagaretnam, K., Krishnan, G., & Lobo, G. J. (2010). An empirical analysis of 
auditor independence in the banking industry. Accounting Review, 85, 
2011–2046.  
Laux, C., & Leuz, C. (2009). The crisis of fair-value accounting: Making sense of 
the recent debate. Accounting, Organizations & Society, 34, 826–834. 
Laux, C., & Leuz, C. (2010). Did fair-value accounting contribute to the financial 
crisis? Journal of Economic Perspectives, 24, 93–118. 
Liu, C. L., Ryan, S. G., & Wahlen, J. M. (1997). Differential valuation 
implications of loan loss provisions across banks and fiscal quarters. 
Accounting Review, 72, 133–146. 
McVay, S., Nagar, V., & Tang, V. W. (2006). Trading incentives to meet analyst 
forecast. Review of Accounting Studies, 11, 575–598. 
35 
 
Matsunaga, S. R., & Park, C. W. (2001). The effect of missing a quarterly 
earnings benchmark on the CEO’s annual bonus. Accounting Review, 76, 
313–332. 
Payne, J. L. (2008). The influence of audit firm specialization on analysts’ 
forecast errors. Auditing: A Journal of Practice & Theory, 27, 109-136.  
Penman, S. H. (2007). Financial reporting quality: is fair value a plus or a minus? 
Accounting & Business Research Special Issue of International 
Accounting Policy Forum, 33–44.  
Phillips, J., Pincus, M., & Rego, S. O. (2003). Earnings management: New 
evidence based on deferred tax expense. Accounting Review, 78, 491–521. 
Pulliam, S., & McGinty, T. (2009). Congress helped banks defang key rule. Wall 
Street Journal, June 3, 2009. Available at: http://online.wsj.com/article/. 
Vyas, D. (2010). The timeliness of accounting write-downs by US financial 
institutions during the financial crisis of 2007–2008. Journal of 
Accounting Research, 49, 823–860. 
Wahlen, J. M. (1994). The nature of information in commercial bank loan loss 
disclosures. Accounting Review, 69, 455–478. 
  
36 
 
 
Table 1 
Differences in Mean and Median Values of Main Bank Characteristics of Interest 
for Pre and Post the Relaxation of Fair Value Rules 
        
  
Before Relaxation of 
Fair Value Rule 
Post Relaxation of 
Fair Value Rule t-test Wilcoxon 
Variable N Mean  Median  Mean  Median   p-value*   p-value * 
Level23 7,306 0.1510 0.1355 0.1719 0.1584 <.0001 <.0001 
Level1 7,306 0.0121 0.0003 0.0083 0.0001 <.0001 0.0008 
Inc 7,306 – 0.0007 0.0012 – 0.0007 0.0010 0.8244 0.0092 
Size 7,306 7.4458 7.1218 7.4087 7.1253 0.3093 0.7458 
Mve 7,306 4.8351 4.5074 4.6399 4.2819 <.0001 <.0001 
Lev 7,306 0.9039 0.9094 0.8992 0.9037 <.0001 <.0001 
Tce 7,306 0.0765 0.0697 0.0811 0.0762 0.0010 <.0001 
This table reports differences in means and medians of variables before and after the relaxation 
of fair value rule in Q2 2009. The sample used in the table consists of all banks with fair value 
hierarchy disclosures between 2007 and 2011 collected from Bank Compustat with non-missing 
values for the variables in the table. T-test (Wilcoxon) p-values test for differences in means 
(medians) for before and after Q2 2009.  
*: P-value is probability > |t| for differences of means and probability > |Z| for differences of 
Wilcoxon median scores (rank sums). 
Variable Definitions: 
Level23: sum of fair value assets disclosed at level 2 and 3, deflated by beginning of quarter 
total assets; 
Level1: fair value assets disclosed at level 1, deflated by beginning of quarter total assets; 
Inc: net income before extraordinary items, deflated by beginning of quarter total assets; 
Size: natural log of total assets; 
Mve: natural log of market value of equity; 
Lev: total liabilities over total assets; 
Tce: common equity minus intangible assets, deflated by beginning of quarter total 
assets.  
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Table 2 
Descriptive Statistics and Correlations for Meeting Earnings  Target Test 
Panel A: Descriptive Statistics  
Variable N Mean Min. Median Max. Std. Dev. 
EM 3,431 0.096 0.000 0.000 1.000 0.294 
∆DFV 3,431 0.530 0.000 1.000 1.000 0.499 
POST 3,431 0.719 0.000 1.000 1.000 0.450 
ULLP 3,431 -0.018 -0.335 -0.041 0.929 0.152 
ΔCFO 3,431 0.001 -0.051 0.001 0.062 0.014 
SIZE 3,431 8.131 5.861 7.781 14.034 1.478 
BM 3,431 1.366 0.341 1.070 5.372 0.919 
DISPERS 3,431 0.088 0.000 0.020 2.550 0.312 
NUMEST 3,431 5.608 1.000 3.000 38.000 5.970 
CHGINC 3,431 -0.002 -10.464 0.000 7.581 0.399 
PERSIST 3,431 0.349 0.000 0.000 1.000 0.477 
CR1 3,431 0.120 0.000 0.117 0.316 0.033 
CR  3,431 0.147 0.001 0.140 0.458 0.043 
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Panel B: Correlations 
         
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) 
(1)EM 1 0.020 0.030 0.007 0.022 -0.071 -0.011 0.014 -0.118 0.032 -0.064 0.006 0.218 0.086 0.159 
(2)AEM 0.024 1 0.042 0.014 -0.005 -0.214 0.005 -0.016 -0.070 0.027 -0.294 0.177 0.044 0.076 0.056 
(3)∆DFV 0.030 0.040 1 0.151 0.033 -0.042 0.002 -0.008 -0.033 0.008 -0.021 0.026 0.046 0.075 0.049 
(4)DFV 0.027 0.155 0.188 1 0.086 -0.052 0.063 0.344 -0.186 0.195 -0.036 0.022 0.111 0.196 0.201 
(5)POST 0.022 0.203 0.033 0.122 1 -0.043 0.056 -0.032 -0.045 0.041 -0.069 0.008 0.056 0.232 0.246 
(6)ULLP -0.057 -0.359 -0.044 -0.005 -0.225 1 -0.100 0.069 0.291 -0.013 0.283 -0.160 -0.167 -0.258 -0.213 
(7)ΔCFO 0.010 0.038 0.023 0.058 0.072 -0.129 1 0.080 -0.041 0.044 0.032 0.009 0.008 0.024 0.039 
(8)SIZE 0.032 0.074 -0.007 0.179 -0.026 0.208 0.077 1 -0.136 0.831 0.108 0.005 0.051 -0.071 0.002 
(9)BM -0.110 -0.150 -0.026 -0.232 0.000 0.085 -0.062 -0.263 1 -0.171 0.261 -0.043 -0.340 -0.244 -0.249 
(10)NUMEST 0.061 0.085 0.029 0.111 -0.002 0.150 0.065 0.789 -0.231 1 0.021 0.001 0.077 0.024 0.050 
(11)DISPERS -0.083 -0.005 0.007 0.035 -0.026 0.244 0.034 0.514 0.049 0.653 1 0.008 -0.138 -0.127 -0.129 
(12)CHGINC 0.031 0.559 0.034 0.048 0.121 -0.251 0.016 0.032 0.005 0.037 0.000 1 0.004 0.041 0.031 
(13)PERSIST 0.218 0.164 0.046 0.145 0.056 -0.177 0.039 0.068 -0.400 0.085 -0.145 0.035 1 0.164 0.213 
(14)CR1 0.061 0.208 0.092 0.244 0.270 -0.164 0.042 -0.031 -0.216 0.073 0.001 0.109 0.169 1 0.709 
(15)CR  0.115 0.240 0.091 0.297 0.355 -0.186 0.079 0.092 -0.243 0.144 -0.016 0.123 0.217 0.780 1 
Panel A reports the descriptive statistics of the variables used in Equation (1). Panel B reports Pearson (Spearman) correlations of the 
variables used in Equation (1) above (below) the diagonal. The number of observations is 3,431. Correlations significant at the 5 per cent 
level in a two tailed test are in boldface. 
Variable Definitions: 
EM: 1 if bank i's quarter q analysts' earnings forecast error is from zero to 1 cent per share, and 0 otherwise; 
AEM: the amount of analysts' earnings forecast error; analyst forecast error is defined as actual earnings per share as reported by 
I/B/E/S less the median of the last analyst forecasts after the previous quarter's earnings announcement and before the 
current quarter's earnings announcement; 
∆DFV: indicator variable equal to 1 if the discretionary fair value assets increased from quarter q-1 to quarter q, and 0 otherwise; 
discretionary fair value assets are defined as the sum of fair value assets measured at level 2 and 3; 
DFV: the amount of discretionary fair value assets; discretionary fair value assets are defined as the sum of fair value assets 
measured at level 2 and 3; 
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POST: indicator variable equal to 1 if the bank-quarter observation occurs during the post relaxation period of fair value rule, and 0 
otherwise. 
ULLP: unexpected loan loss provisions in quarter q, estimated following the procedures in Wahlen (1994); 
ΔCFO: change in bank i's cash flows from continuing operations from q-1 to q, scaled by total assets at the beginning of quarter q;  
SIZE: size of the bank, estimated as the natural log of total assets; 
BM: market to book ratio, estimated as the book value of equity over the market value of equity; 
DISPERS: analyst forecast dispersion, measured as the standard deviation of analyst earnings forecast; 
NUMEST: analyst coverage, measured as the number of analysts covering the bank; 
CHGINC: change in earnings, estimated as the change in bank i's earnings per share from quarter q-1 to quarter q deflated by the bank's 
share price at the beginning of quarter q; 
PERSIST: earnings persistence, measured as an indicator variable equal to 1 if the bank is within middle three quintiles of the 
distribution of CHGINC and 0 otherwise; 
CR1: tier 1 capital ratio; 
CR: total capital ratio; 
  
40 
 
 
Table 3 
Descriptive Statistics and Correlations for Earnings Response Coefficient Test 
Panel A: Descriptive Statistics  
Variable 
 
Mean 
 
Min. 
 
Median 
 
Max. 
 
Std. Dev. 
CAR 
 
0.004 
 
– 0.329 
 
0.001 
 
0.346 
 
0.109 
ΔE 
 
– 0.187 
 
– 5.409 
 
– 0.036 
 
4.264 
 
1.020 
∆DFV 
 
0.476 
 
0.000 
 
0.000 
 
1.000 
 
--- 
POST 
 
0.569 
 
0.000 
 
1.000 
 
1.000 
 
--- 
           Panel B: Correlations 
  
N 
 
CAR 
 
ΔE 
 
∆DFV 
 
POST 
CAR 
 
4,148 
 
1 
 
0.106 
 
– 0.010 
 
0.008 
ΔE 
 
4,148 
 
0.134 
 
1 
 
0.027 
 
0.148 
∆DFV 
 
4,148 
 
– 0.012 
 
0.011 
 
1 
 
– 0.012 
POST 
 
4,148 
 
0.021 
 
0.226 
 
– 0.012 
 
1 
              
    Panel A reports the descriptive statistics of the variables used in Equation (2). Panel B 
reports Pearson (Spearman) correlations of the variables used in Equation (2) above 
(below) the diagonal. Correlations significant at the 5 per cent level in a two tailed test are 
in boldface.  
Variable Definitions: 
CAR = cumulative market-adjusted returns (raw return minus the value-weighted 
market index), inclusive of dividends and other distributions computed 
over the three-day window surrounding the earnings announcement 
beginning one day before and one day after the quarter earnings 
announcement; 
ΔE = unexpected earnings, measured as the seasonally adjusted change in net 
income for bank i, scaled by end-of-period shares outstanding; 
∆DFV = indicator variable equal to 1 if the discretionary fair value assets increased 
from quarter q-1 to quarter q, and 0 otherwise; discretionary fair value 
assets are defined as the sum of fair value assets measured at level 2 and 3; 
POST = indicator variable equal to 1 if the bank-quarter observation occurs during 
the post relaxation period of fair value rule, and 0 otherwise. 
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Table 4 
Logit Regression Results for Meeting Earnings Target (EM Test) 
 
 
 
Panel A: Random Effect Logit Model 
 Variable 
Predicted 
Sign 
Without 
interaction 
with POST 
Marginal 
Prob. 
Interacting 
POST with 
∆DRA  
Marginal 
Prob. 
      Intercept – 3.444*** – 3.209*** 
  (– 4.14)  (– 3.84)  
POST ? , ? 0.354 0.017 0.009 0.001 
  (1.07)  (0.02)  
∆DFV + , ? 0.156 0.008 – 0.303 – 0.016 
  (1.20)  (– 1.20)  
∆DFV*POST +   0.625** 0.035 
    (2.13)  
ULLP – , – – 2.119** – 0.109 – 2.093*** – 0.107 
  (– 2.06)  (– 2.03)  
ΔCFO – , – – 5.367 – 0.276 – 4.895 – 0.251 
  (– 1.12)  (– 1.02)  
SIZE ? , ? – 0.034 – 0.002 – 0.033 – 0.002 
  (– 0.36)  (– 0.35)  
BM – , – – 0.158 – 0.010 – 0.199 – 0.010 
  (– 1.50)  (– 1.51)  
DISPERS – , – – 1.733 – 0.089 – 1.763 – 0.090 
  (– 1.49)  (– 1.50)  
NUMEST ? , ? 0.022 0.001 0.022 0.001 
  (1.01)  (1.02)  
CHGINC + , + 0.087 0.004 0.082 0.004 
  (0.21)  (0.20)  
PERSIST + , + 1.131*** 0.070 1.133*** 0.070 
  (7.92)  (7.93)  
CR1 + , + – 1.716 – 0.088 – 1.986 – 0.102 
  (– 0.61)  (– 0.71)  
CR + , + 7.821*** 0.402 7.937*** 0.407 
  (4.21)  (4.30)  
     
 Year Fixed Effects  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
0 1 2 3
4 5 6 1 7 1 8 9
10 11 12 13
*
1 (1)
q q q
q q q q q q
q q q q q
EM POST DFV DFV POST
ULLP CFO SIZE BM DISPERS NUMEST
CHGINC PERSIST CR CR
   
     
    
 
     
      
    
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Log Likelihood  – 958.03  – 955.76 
 # Observations   3431 3431 3431 3431 
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Panel B: Fixed Effect Logit Model 
 Variable 
Predicted 
Sign 
Without 
interaction 
with POST 
Marginal 
Prob. 
Interacting 
POST with 
∆DRA  
Marginal 
Prob. 
      POST ? , ? 0.077 0.017 – 0.454 – 0.113 
  (0.25)  (– 1.14)  
∆DFV + , ? 0.195 0.043 – 0.543 – 0.135 
  (0.88)  (– 1.29)  
∆DFV*POST +   1.037** 0.254 
    (2.07)  
ULLP – , – – 1.188 – 0.261 – 0.784 – 0.196 
  (– 0.28)  (– 0.18)  
ΔCFO – , – – 3.326 – 0.733 – 1.634 – 0.408 
  (– 0.50)  (– 0.24)  
SIZE ? , ? – 0.185 – 0.041 – 0.050 – 0.012 
  (– 0.17)  (– 0.05)  
BM – , – – 0.371 – 0.082 – 0.434 – 0.108 
  (– 0.67)  (– 0.76)  
DISPERS – , – – 5.515 – 1.214 – 6.078 – 1.518 
  (– 0.87)  (– 0.94)  
NUMEST ? , ? 0.049 0.011 0.054 0.013 
  (0.58)  (0.63)  
CHGINC + , + 4.806 1.059 5.042 1.259 
  (1.39)  (1.44)  
PERSIST + , + 0.935*** 0.200 0.926*** 0.227 
  (3.89)  (3.83)  
CR1 + , + – 15.278 – 3.365 – 15.393 – 3.845 
  (– 1.24)  (– 1.24)  
CR + , + 12.939 2.849 12.738 3.182 
  (1.35)  (1.30)  
     
 Firm Fixed Effects  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Fixed Effects  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Log Likelihood  – 214.79  – 212.59 
 # Observations   471 471 471 471 
*,**,*** Indicates statistical significance at the 0.10, 0.05 and 0.01 levels, respectively, under 
two-tailed tests. 
Table 4 reports Logit regression estimates of Equation (1). Column 1 reports the results for 
Equation (1) without interaction with POST. Column 3 reports the regression results of 
Equation (1) when interacting ∆DRA with POST. Average marginal effects are reported in the 
column beside the coefficients.  
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Reported are the coefficients from models using robust standard errors clustered by firm; z-
statistics are in parentheses.  
The variables are defined in Table 2. 
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 Table 5 
Regression Results for Earnings Response Coefficient (ERC Test) 
 
 
 
 Variable 
Predicted 
Sign 
 
Fixed Effect 
Model 
With additional 
controls 
   
 
 Intercept 
 
– 0.017 0.202*** 
 
 
 (– 1.49) (2.96) 
POST ?  0.014*** 0.012*** 
   (3.49) (2.64) 
ΔE +  0.008*** 0.008*** 
   (4.05) ( 3.88) 
∆DFV –   – 0.001 – 0.001 
   (– 0.59) (– 0.42) 
ΔE*POST ?  – 0.002 – 0.001 
   (– 0.75) (– 0.66) 
ΔE*∆DFV –   0.003 0.003 
   (1.22) (1.14) 
ΔE*∆DFV*POST –  – 0.007** – 0.007** 
   (– 2.03) (– 1.96) 
SIZE –   – 0.029*** 
    (– 3.22) 
MTB –   – 0.001 
    (– 0.48) 
RATE –    – 0.001 
    (– 1.63) 
Firm Fixed Effects   Yes Yes 
Year Fixed Effects   Yes Yes 
 Adj. R
2
   0.014 0.015 
# Observations     4148 4148 
*,**,*** Indicates statistical significance at the 0.10, 0.05 and 0.01 
levels, respectively, under two-tailed tests. 
Table 5 reports the fixed effect model results for Equation (2).    
t-statistics are in parentheses using robust standard errors clustered by 
firm. The variables are as defined in Table 3. The additional variables 
included are: 
 
0 1 2 3 4
5 6
*
* * * (2)
t q q q
q q q q q
CAR POST E DFV E POST
E DFV E DFV POST
    
  
       
      
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SIZE = natural log of total assets. 
MTB = market to book ratio. 
RATE = risk-free interest rate, equivalent to one-year US T-bill rate.  
The other variables are defined in Table 3. 
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Table 6 
Logit Regression Results for Meeting Earnings Target: Including Discretionary 
Fair Value Liabilities (∆DFL) 
Dependent Variable = EM 
 Variable 
Predict
ed Sign 
Without 
interaction 
with POST 
Marginal 
Prob. 
Interacting 
POST with 
∆DRA  
Marginal 
Prob. 
      POST ? , ? 0.079 0.016 – 0.342 – 0.033 
  (0.26)  (– 0.84)  
∆DFV + , ? 0.190 0.038 – 0.637 – 0.060 
  (0.85)  (– 0.84)  
∆DFV*POST +   1.037** 0.112 
    (2.24)  
∆DFL – , ? 0.077 0.016 0.802 0.089 
  -0.230  -1.340  
∆DFL*POST –   – 0.918 – 0.065 
    (– 1.40)  
ULLP – , – – 1.147 – 0.228 – 0.500 – 0.046 
  (– 0.27)  (– 0.11)  
ΔCFO – , – – 3.377 – 0.673 – 1.311 – 0.120 
  (– 0.51)  (– 0.19)  
SIZE ? , ? – 0.216 – 0.043 – 0.332 – 0.030 
  (– 0.20)  (– 0.30)  
BM – , – – 0.373 – 0.074 – 0.449 – 0.041 
  (– 0.67)  (– 0.78)  
DISPERS – , – – 5.549 – 1.105 – 6.752 – 0.616 
  (– 0.88)  (– 1.03)  
NUMEST ? ,? 0.047 0.009 0.082 0.007 
  (0.56)  (0.93)  
CHGINC + , + 4.785 0.953 5.015 0.458 
  (1.39)  (1.43)  
PERSIST + , + 0.936*** 0.181 0.920*** 0.082 
  (3.90)  (3.79)  
CR1 + , + – 15.351 – 3.058 – 16.295 – 1.448 
  (– 1.25)  (– 1.30)  
CR + , + 13.013 2.592 13.460 1.229 
  (1.35)  (1.36)  
     
 Firm Fixed Effects  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Fixed Effects   Yes Yes Yes Yes 
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Log Likelihood  – 214.77  – 211.59 
 # Observations   471 471 471 471 
*,**,*** Indicates statistical significance at the 0.10, 0.05 and 0.01 levels, respectively, 
under two-tailed tests. 
Table 6 reports fixed effect Logit regression results of Equation (1) with the additional 
variable of ∆DFL. Column 1 reports the regression results of the base version of 
Equation (1) without interaction with POST. Column 3 reports the regression results of 
Equation (1) when interacting ∆DFV and ∆DFL with POST. Average marginal effects 
are reported in the column beside the coefficients.  
Reported are the coefficients from models using robust standard errors clustered by firm; 
z-statistics are in parentheses.  
∆DFL = indicator variable equal to 1 if the discretionary fair value liabilities increased 
from quarter q-1 to quarter q, and 0 otherwise; discretionary fair value liabilities are 
defined as the sum of fair value liabilities measured at level 2 and 3. 
The other variables are defined in Table 2. 
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Table 7 
Logit Regression Results for Meeting Earnings Target: Actual Amount of Change 
in Discretionary Fair Value Assets (DDFV) 
Dependent Variable = EM 
 Variable 
Predicted 
Sign 
Without 
interaction 
with POST 
Marginal 
Prob. 
Interacting 
POST with 
∆DRA  
Marginal 
Prob. 
      Intercept – 3.089*** – 3.087*** 
  (– 4.08)  (– 4.09)  
POST ? , ? 0.309 0.025  0.271 0.021 
  (0.93)  (0.81)  
DDFV + , ? 0.313 0.025 – 4.298 – 0.344 
  (0.21)  (– 1.30)  
DDFV*POST + 
 
 6.689* 0.536 
  
 
 (1.79)  
ULLP – , – – 1.955*** – 0.157 – 1.949*** – 0.156 
  (– 2.68)  (– 2.67)  
ΔCFO – , – – 5.896 – 0.473 – 5.597 – 0.448 
  (– 1.18)  (– 1.13)  
SIZE ? , ? – 0.012 – 0.001 – 0.009 – 0.001 
  (– 0.14)  (– 0.10)  
BM – , – – 0.199 – 0.016 – 0.195 – 0.016 
  (– 1.60)  (– 1.56)  
DISPERS – , – – 2.622 – 0.210 – 2.595 – 0.208 
  (– 0.97)  (– 0.97)  
NUMEST ? , ? 0.017 0.001 0.017 0.001 
  (0.81)  (0.80)  
CHGINC + , + 0.092 0.007 0.090 0.007 
  (0.46)  (0.45)  
PERSIST + , + 1.107*** 0.089 1.115*** 0.089 
  (7.49)  (7.54)  
CR1 + , + – 2.866 – 0.230 – 2.921 – 0.234 
  (– 1.09)  (– 1.10)  
CR + , + 7.438*** 0.596 7.466*** 0.598 
  (4.77)  (4.75)  
     
 Year Fixed Effects  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
 
Log Likelihood 
 – 965.22  – 967.53 
 # Observations   3431 3431 3431 3431 
*,**,*** Indicates statistical significance at the 0.10, 0.05 and 0.01 levels, respectively, 
under two-tailed tests. 
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Table 7 reports Logit regression results of Equation (1) using actual amount of increase 
in discretionary fair value assets. Column 1 reports the regression results of the base 
version of Equation (1) without interaction with POST. Column 3 reports the regression 
results of Equation (1) when interacting DDFV with POST. Average marginal effects are 
reported in the column beside the coefficients.  
Reported are the coefficients from models using robust standard errors clustered by firm; 
z-statistics are in parentheses.  
DDFV = the amount of change in discretionary (level 2 & 3) fair value assets deflated by 
total assets at the beginning of the quarter.  
The other variables are defined in Table 2. 
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Table 8 
Logit Regression Results for Meeting Earnings Target: Extended Model 
Dependent Variable = EM 
 Variable 
Predicted 
Sign 
Without 
interaction 
with POST 
Marginal 
Prob. 
Interacting 
POST with 
∆DRA  
Marginal 
Prob. 
      Intercept – 3.526*** – 1.376 
  (– 4.52)  (– 0.85)  
POST ? , ? 0.323 0.026 – 2.767 – 0.220 
  (0.97)  (– 1.47)  
ΔCFO – , – – 5.858 – 0.468 – 4.864 – 0.387 
  (– 1.16)  (– 0.93)  
∆DFV + , ? 0.198* 0.016 – 0.296 – 0.024 
  (1.68)  (– 1.25)  
∆DFV*POST +   0.680*** 0.054 
    (2.54)  
DFV ? , ? – 1.369** – 0.109 – 0.748 – 0.059 
  (– 2.06)  (– 0.52)  
DFV*POST +   – 0.784 – 0.062 
    (– 0.52)  
ULLP – , – – 1.811*** – 0.145 – 4.963** – 0.395 
  (– 2.58)  (– 1.95)  
ULLP*POST ?   3.340 0.266 
    (1.22)  
SIZE ? , ? 0.051 0.004 – 0.191 – 0.015 
  (0.56)  (– 1.09)  
SIZE*POST ?   0.332 0.026 
    (1.64)  
BM – , – – 0.217* – 0.017 – 0.215 – 0.017 
  (– 1.72)  (– 0.88)  
BM*POST ?   0.011 0.001 
    (0.04)  
DISPERS – , – – 2.664 – 0.213 – 1.248 – 0.099 
  (– 1.01)  (– 0.63)  
DISPERS*POST ?   – 3.347 – 0.266 
    (– 0.84)  
NUMEST ? , ? 0.008 0.001 0.066 0.005 
  (0.41)  1.45  
NUMEST*POST ?   – 0.071 – 0.005 
    (– 1.48)  
CHGINC + , + 0.099 0.008 0.281 0.022 
  (0.51)  (0.40)  
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CHGINC*POST ?   – 0.172 – 0.014 
    (– 0.23)  
PERSIST + , + 1.114*** 0.089 0.946*** 0.075 
  (7.59)  (3.61)  
PERSIST*POST ?   0.204 0.016 
    (0.66)  
CR1 + , + – 2.139 – 0.171 – 2.332 – 0.185 
  (– 0.79)  (– 0.33)  
CR1*POST ?   0.608 0.048 
    (0.08)  
CR + , + 7.602*** 0.608 4.754 0.378 
  (4.76)  (1.46)  
CR*POST ?   3.524 0.280 
    (0.89)  
     
 Year Fixed Effects   Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Log Likelihood  – 965.22  – 958.49 
 # Observations   3431 3431 3431 3431 
*,**,*** Indicates statistical significance at the 0.10, 0.05 and 0.01 levels, respectively, 
under two-tailed tests. 
Table 8 reports Logit regression results of Equation (1). Column 1 reports the regression 
results of the base version of Equation (1) without interaction with POST. Column 3 reports 
the regression results of Equation (1) when interacting the variables with POST. Average 
marginal effects are reported in the column beside the coefficients.  
Reported are the coefficients from models using robust standard errors clustered by firm; z-
statistics are in parentheses.  
The variables are defined in Table 2. 
 
